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Rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under 
left-wing and right-wing governments. It also suggests temporary post-electoral booms after 
election of left-wing governments and temporary recessions after election of right-wing ones. 
However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the 
degree of pre-electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using pre-electoral polling data, we 
provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of rational partisan 
cycles. We also show that - in line with most previous empirical studies - there is little 
evidence for partisan cycles under adaptive expectations. 
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1. Introduction
The aim of traditional business cycle theory is to develop policy proposals for a welfare
maximizing government in order to smooth or eliminate cyclical ﬂuctuations of aggregate
activity. The critique of the assumption of welfare maximizing governments by the pro-
ponents of New Political Economy1 led to a completely diﬀerent perspective on business
cycle theory. Building on Downs’ (1957) idea of applying the market model to politics
and to model politicians as agents maximizing their personal utilities, a new type of
business cycle model, the so-called ”politico-economic models of business cycles”, evolved.
In these models politicians (or governmental institutions) are identiﬁed as sources of
macroeconomic instabilities. Over the last 25 years a variety of diﬀerent politico-economic
business cycle theories have been developed and tested empirically. Most of these models
can be assigned to one of two subgroups: the ”opportunistic” or the ”partisan models”.
The opportunistic models assume that the government is primarily interested in being
reelected. Famous opportunistic models are those of Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977),
which both start out from the assumption of adaptive expectations within the private
sector. By making use of - at least temporarily - existing money illusion of the private
sector the government actively creates business cycles in order to generate a situation in
which it is likely to be reelected by short-sighted voters. The later opportunistic models
of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988), Rogoﬀ (1990), Persson and
Tabellini (1990) and Herrendorf and Neumann (1997) are based on the assumption of
rational expectations. In rational expectations models of political business cycles the
basic reason for the incentive of the government to generate macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
is some kind of informational asymmetry between the private and the public sector.
In partisan models, governments of diﬀerent political parties represent diﬀerent inter-
ests, depending on the preferences of the groups they were supported by in the election. In
contrast to opportunistic governments, partisan governments are not primarily interested
in winning the next election.
1 Compare Arrow (1951), Dahl and Lindblom (1953), Downs (1957) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962).3
In this article we will focus solely on partisan theory. Using data from OECD countries
we test for partisan theory under both, adaptive and rational expectations. Our analysis
is based on work by Alesina and Roubini (1992) who use panel regressions to uncover
partisan eﬀects of unemployment, output and inﬂation. Our analysis diﬀers from most
previous studies in several respects. First, we use monthly data (instead of yearly or
quarterly) to be able to match election dates and macroeconomic eﬀects more accurately.
Second, we take the problem of non-stationary time-series into account. Third and most
important, we use pre-electoral polling data to test how far pre-electoral uncertainty
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the macroeconomic outcome as suggested by rational partisan
theory instead of focussing solely on those elections which led to a change in government
as Alesina and Roubini (1992) and the majority of other studies did.
The implications of partisan theory under adaptive and under rational expectations are
the same as far as the predicted pattern of inﬂation is concerned. Our empirical analysis
supports the hypothesis of partisan diﬀerences in the inﬂation rate under left-wing and
right-wing governments. However, we ﬁnd virtually no evidence in favor of partisan theory
under adaptive expectations concerning the predicted pattern of unemployment rates. In
contrast to that, pre-electoral uncertainty turns out to be a signiﬁcant factor of the post-
electoral development of unemployment, as rational partisan theory implies. We interpret
our empirical ﬁndings as supportive of partisan theory under rational expectations.
In section 2 we will give a brief overview on adaptive and rational partisan theory.
Section 3 deals with a condensed review of the empirical ﬁndings in respect to adaptive
and rational partisan theory. In this context we will highlight some shortcomings of the
existing empirical work on partisan theory, especially the fact that the central theoretical
innovation of rational partisan theory, that partisan eﬀects depend on ex ante electoral
uncertainty, has rarely been tested. In section 4 we present the results of a panel regression
of OECD countries to test for partisan eﬀects. Section 5 draws some conclusions and
makes some suggestions for future research.4
2. Partisan theory
Soon after the Nordhaus-model was published, partisan theory started to develop. Hibbs
(1977) denies the view that politicians are primarily interested in being reelected. As
a consequence, the thesis of converging political programs resulting from the median
voter theorem does not hold here. Instead it is assumed that diﬀerent parties prefer
diﬀerent programs for ideological reasons. These political programs are closely related
to the preferences of the people who support the party. After winning an election, the
politicians will realize a partisan-policy that favors their supporters.
2.1. Partisan theory under adaptive expectations
Hibbs’ model (1977) employs a stable Phillips curve trade-oﬀ between unemployment and
inﬂation which results from the assumption of adaptive price expectations and money
illusion.2 The inﬂation rate is assumed to be a policy instrument of the government.
By ﬁxing the inﬂation rate the government can inﬂuence unemployment (and aggregate
output) systematically.
The typical assumption of partisan theory is that both left-wing and right-wing
governments are interested in low inﬂation and low unemployment but to a diﬀerent
extent. While left-wing governments are supposed to put relatively more weight on the
goal of low unemployment, right-wing governments are more concerned with the goal
of stable prices.3 In consequence, left-wing and right-wing governments choose diﬀerent
combinations of inﬂation and unemployment and thus diﬀerent points on the Phillips
curve. Left-wing governments choose relatively high inﬂation rates and thereby end up
2 By Okun’s law the model can be rewritten in terms of aggregate output instead of unemployment.
3 Hibbs (1977) argues that the major group of supporters of right-wing parties comes from the upper
middle class. This group regularly holds considerable amounts of nominally ﬁxed assets and is likely to
suﬀer from cold progression in progressive tax systems. That is why the upper middle class is compara-
tively inﬂation averse. The supporters of left-wing governments typically have lower incomes and lower
wealth, in addition to which human capital takes a large proportion of their wealth. Thus, supporters
of left-wing governments have relatively less to lose in inﬂationary times. Because of their lower level of
nominal wealth and the fact that their jobs are typically less secure than those of the upper middle class
the supporters of left-wing governments are more concerned with the goal of high employment.5
with relatively low unemployment rates, while right-wing governments accept higher
degrees of unemployment to guarantee more price stability.
In summary, under adaptive partisan theory we should be able to observe partisan
diﬀerences in inﬂation and unemployment that depend on the political orientation of the
current government.
2.2. Rational partisan theory
The paradigm of rational expectations has had a major inﬂuence on economic theory,
even political business cycle theory. Alesina (1987,1988) was the ﬁrst to develop partisan
models of business cycles under the assumption of rational expectations of the private
sector. From a modelling point of view, rational partisan theory is based upon the models
of time inconsistency of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b).
As is well known, these models end up with an inﬂationary bias, i.e. a suboptimal high
but fully anticipated inﬂation rate. The magnitude of the bias depends on the weights
the monetary authority assigns to the goals of price stability and high employment as
well as on the ambitious employment target the monetary authority tries to reach. Since,
as has been discussed earlier, left-wing governments put more weight on the ambitious
output target, they generate higher inﬂation rates than right-wing governments. Thus,
the implications of Hibbs’ (1977) and Alesina’s (1987,1988) models do only slightly diﬀer
with respect to partisan diﬀerences in inﬂation.4
However, the two models have diﬀerent implications for the pattern of unemployment
(output). In Alesina’s (1987,1988) model the case for political business cycles results
from pre-electoral uncertainty about the election outcome. In wage negotiations well
before elections, trade unions have to build some expectation of the election outcome in
order to decide on the wage rate optimally. They will anticipate some weighted average
of inﬂation rates under left-wing and right-wing governments. The anticipated inﬂation
4 Under rational expectations, the inﬂation rate under right-wing (left-wing) governments tends to
decrease (increase) slightly in the course of the term of oﬃce. This is due to the fact that in the election
period the optimal choice of the inﬂation rate also depends on the preferences of the competing party while
this is not the case in non-election-periods. While we do not test for this eﬀect directly it is consistent
with the empirical test we apply.6
rate turns out to be wrong whenever the election outcome has not been expected with
certainty. Thus, when a right-wing government wins the election, the anticipated inﬂation
rate turns out to be too high resulting in a post-electoral recession (i.e. an increasing
unemployment rate and a decreasing aggregate output). Analogously, a public vote for
a left-wing government should cause a post-electoral boom. Moreover, the magnitude of
recessions and booms should be positively correlated to the degree of the electoral surprise
(i.e. the post-electoral eﬀect on unemployment (output) should be more pronounced when
the election result was somewhat unexpected by the public). In non-election periods,
therefore, there is no uncertainty about the government’s type and the inﬂation rate is
correctly anticipated. Obviously, unemployment equals its natural rate in these periods.
While the empirical implications of rational partisan theory with respect to inﬂation
are somewhat similar as under adaptive expectations (left-wing governments generate
higher inﬂation rates than right-wing governments), the expected patterns for unemploy-
ment obviously diﬀer. According to rational partisan theory we should be able to observe
short-term recessions soon after (at least somewhat) unexpected elections of right-wing
governments and short-term booms after unexpected elections of left-wing governments.
The magnitude of these booms and recessions should depend positively on the electoral
surprise of the election outcome.
3. A review of previous empirical results
During the last 25 years, political business cycle theory has been subject to many empir-
ical studies.5 In the following we will brieﬂy review the basic results of empirical studies
dealing with partisan theory.
5 For an overview on the results of empirical studies on political business cycles see e.g. Belke (2000).7
3.1. Partisan theory under adaptive expectations
As shown in the previous section, partisan theory under adaptive expectations im-
plies that left-wing governments generate higher inﬂation rates and lower unemployment
throughout the whole period of oﬃce than right-wing governments.
With respect to partisan diﬀerences in inﬂation rates, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for the United States in support of partisan theory under adap-
tive expectations. For the same country, however, Haynes (1995) ﬁnds diﬀerences in
inﬂationary patterns which are not statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, Alesina and Roubini
(1992) ﬁnd marginally insigniﬁcant partisan eﬀects of inﬂation in a panel analysis of 18
OECD countries. For a smaller subsample of 8 so-called ”bi-partisan-countries” with
very pronounced left-wing and right-wing parties, the partisan eﬀects turn out to be
signiﬁcant. Signiﬁcant partisan eﬀects of inﬂation were also discovered in the studies by
Alesina (1989), Neumann (1989) and Paldam (1979). Berger and Woitek (1997) ﬁnd no
robust evidence in favor of partisan diﬀerences in inﬂation in German data and a study
for Chile by Edwards (1993) rejects signiﬁcant partisan diﬀerences in inﬂation.
There is also a considerable number of empirical studies trying to discover partisan
diﬀerences in monetary policy instruments. Chappell and Keech (1988) ﬁnd signiﬁcant
partisan eﬀects with respect to the growth of the monetary aggregate M1. Similar re-
sults were obtained by Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina (1988) and Havrilesky (1987).
Studying the voting behavior of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), McGregor (1996) concludes that partisan eﬀects played a major role herein.
A similar analysis by Lang and Welzel (1992) for Germany comes to the same result.
On the other hand Vaubel (1993) was not able to discover partisan behavior of German
Bundesbank.
Hibbs (1977) ﬁnds evidence for permanent partisan eﬀects of unemployment in the
United States and the United Kingdom. Most other studies were not able to ﬁnd per-
manent diﬀerences in unemployment or output (see e.g. Berger and Woitek (1997)). In8
their panel analysis of 18 OECD countries Alesina and Roubini (1992) ﬁnd signiﬁcant
partisan eﬀects neither of unemployment nor of output growth.
Altogether we might conclude that the empirical support towards partisan theory
under adaptive expectations is quite weak. While signiﬁcant partisan eﬀects towards
inﬂation (or the underlying instruments of monetary policy) were often discovered, there
is virtually no evidence in favor of permanent partisan diﬀerences in unemployment or
output growth.
3.2. Partisan theory under rational expectations
Since the implications of rational partisan theory with respect to inﬂation are the same
as under adaptive expectations, we can refer to the studies summarized in the previous
subsection for empirical results on inﬂation.
There are several empirical studies which try to discover temporary partisan eﬀects
of unemployment (and/or output) for the United States. The studies by Alesina (1988),
Alesina and Sachs (1988), Chappell and Keech (1988), Sheﬀrin (1989), Alesina, Lon-
dregan and Rosenthal (1991), Klein (1996) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) all ﬁnd
evidence they interpret as being in line with rational partisan theory. There are also
a number of single country studies which reject temporary partisan eﬀects of unem-
ployment, e.g. Alogoskouﬁs and Philippopoulos (1991) for Greece; Annett (1993) for
Ireland; Crosby, Brown and Malady (1995) for Australia and Berger and Woitek (1997)
for Germany. Sheﬀrin (1989), Haynes and Stone (1994) and Zaleski (1992) reject rational
partisan theory for U.S. data. In their panel analysis of 18 (inﬂation) respective 14 (un-
employment) OECD countries Alesina and Roubini (1992) report results they interpret
as supportive to partisan theory under rational expectations.
Altogether the empirical evidence towards rational partisan theory is somewhat mixed.
We suppose this to be due to several shortcomings which shall be addressed in the
following.
First, it should be noted that a large part of the empirical evidence in favor of rational
partisan theory was obtained on the basis of U.S. data. This is especially true for evidence9
on the predicted pattern of unemployment rates and output. Sheﬀrin (1989, p. 251) states:
,,The theory of rational partisan business cycles should apply to other democracies besides
the United States. However, there have been few tests of the theory outside the United
States with its relatively scarce number of observations.”6 This critique is still valid.
Especially multi-country studies, such as that conducted by Alesina and Roubini (1992),
are very scarce.
Second, most of the studies use low-frequency data (annual, quarterly). It might be
suspected that doing so causes considerable biases in most empirical designs. This can
easily be shown at the example of annual data. When one is trying to discover temporary
eﬀects in unemployment, when exactly the election took place plays an important role,
i.e. the results will depend heavily on whether the elections took place in January or in
December. To be able to design an empirical analysis properly it is therefore highly useful
to use monthly data.7
Third, most of the empirical studies do not test for stationarity of the times series of
unemployment and inﬂation (see Belke (2000)). Thus, it is possible that a considerable
proportion of the results in favor of rational partisan theory is in fact the result of spurious
correlation.8
Last but by far not least, most empirical studies of temporary partisan eﬀects on
unemployment (output) are misspeciﬁed. The majority of studies investigates whether
the election of a right-wing government caused a post-electoral temporary recession and
whether the appointment of a left-wing government induced a temporary boom. In their
panel study, Alesina and Roubini (1992, p. 669) argue that these studies are misspeciﬁed
because ,,... for long periods of time in many countries in the sample certain parties
repeatedly won elections with virtually no political uncertainty”. Therefore they decide
to concentrate on those elections which led to a change in government orientation, i.e.
changes from left-wing to right-wing governments or the other way round. Obviously it
6 For a similar opinion compare Belke (2000).
7 See Berger and Woitek (1997), p. 181 for a similar view.
8 We will address the problem of stationarity and spurious correlation in the next section in more
detail.10
is also possible that it comes as a surprise for a government to be reelected. Similarly a
change in government might have been expected by the public. Thus, the test by Alesina
and Roubini (1992) is not an adequate test of rational partisan theory. This fact is even
implicitly admitted by the authors when they state ,,Rather than trying to estimate the
degree of political uncertainty in every period, which would be rather diﬃcult, we have
chosen to estimate a somewhat weaker form of RPT, testing for temporary eﬀects on real
variables after actual changes of governments”. In his critical survey of empirical work
on partisan theory Hibbs (1992, p. 366) therefore concludes ,,Oddly, the RPT’s central
theoretical innovation - partisan eﬀects depend on ex ante electoral uncertainty - never
has been tested”. Since Hibb’s (1992) critique only a few attempts have been made to
include electoral uncertainty explicitly in the analysis. Regularly these studies make use
of pre-electoral polling data. Belke (1996) ﬁnds evidence in favor of rational partisan
theory for Germany and the United States. Similar results were obtained by Alesina,
Roubini and Cohen (1997) for the United States.9
4. Empirical results
We will now turn to a multi-country study of partisan theories of the business cycle.
Similar to Alesina and Roubini (1992) we conduct so-called panel-regressions to study
the existence of partisan eﬀects. In contrast to Alesina and Roubini (1992), we use more
highly frequent (monthly) inﬂation and unemployment data and explicitly consider the
properties of the time series of inﬂation and unemployment. With respect to rational
partisan theory we apply a more direct test of the hypothesis of post-electoral business
cycles caused by pre-electoral uncertainty about the election result by using polling data.
9 We will discuss these studies in more detail in the next section.11
4.1. Data
The choice of our sample is primarily due to the availability of monthly data for inﬂation
and unemployment.10 Because of incomplete time series, Greece and New Zealand had to
be excluded from the analysis.11 To run empirical tests of Partisan theory it is necessary
to classify governments into left- and right-wing ones. While this is comparatively easy
to do in countries with pure two-party systems the classiﬁcation is somewhat more
problematic when coalition governments were in oﬃce. In the latter case we decided to
classify the government according to the party the head of government is coming from.
We had to exclude some further countries from the analysis due to certain features of the
political landscape or the institutional setting. First, countries without a democratically
legitimated government should not enter the sample. That is why the time series of Spain
and Portugal are not considered before 1977:06 and 1975:04, respectively. Second, the
tests require a minimum degree of political stability in the countries under consideration.
Since Portugal went through as many as 10 diﬀerent governments during its ﬁrst 7 years
of democracy we further restricted the Portuguese sample to a starting point of 1982:04.
Because of its generally low degree of political stability we also deleted Italy completely
from the sample. Since most of the empirical tests require both left- and right-wing
governments in the sample we thirdly excluded those countries where the government
orientation did not change at all (Japan, Switzerland).12 Belgium was excluded because
we found no reasonable way to classify the governments (primarily due to the fact that
most of the time there were coalitions of the major left-wing and right-wing parties). Last
but not least the sample period of all countries which actually take part in the EMU was
10 We did not consider aggregate output since output data are regularly not available on a monthly
basis. The analysis of instrument variables such as monetary aggregates or interest rates are beyond the
scope of this paper.
11 It should be noted that missing data in the time series were closed via linear interpolation.
12 While it is principally possible to leave these countries in the sample when running panel regressions
we decided not to do so since we feel more comfortable with having at least one observation of every type
of government in the sample.12
restricted to the end of 200013 since the governments of these countries transferred their
monetary authorities to a supranational institution, the European Central Bank.
We use the consumer price index (CPI, all items) to calculate the monthly inﬂation
rate. The inﬂation sample consists of 17 OECD countries. The raw CPI data had to be
extracted from various databases. The sample periods and the sources of the CPI data
are shown in table I. We used Census X12 to seasonally adjust the CPI time series.14





with Pt being the consumer price index at time t.
Similar to the CPI data, monthly standardized unemployment rates15 had to be taken
from several diﬀerent sources (compare table II). To exclude seasonal eﬀects we again
used seasonally adjusted time series.
Besides economic data we also used political data on election dates, election outcomes
and party preferences. The data on election dates, outcomes and party preferences come
from various country-speciﬁc sources (compare table III). Additional information on
election results was taken from Caramani (2000) and several internet pages.16 To classify
the relevant parties with respect to their party preferences (left or right) we primarily
used Ismayr (1999) and von Beyme (1985).
4.2. Partisan differences in inflation rates
We will ﬁrst focus on partisan diﬀerences with respect to the inﬂation rate. According
to both, partisan theory under both adaptive and rational expectations, we should be
able to observe permanently higher inﬂation rates under left-wing than under right-wing
governments. To get a ﬁrst impression on the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we
13 We did not restrict the sample to the exact beginning of EMU (which was 1.1.1999) since national
monetary policies aﬀected macroeconomic variables with a time lag.
14 We used EViews 4.0 for this purpose. All following empirical tests were also done with EViews.
15 Unemployment rates for Norway were available on a quarterly basis only. We transformed the time
series to a monthly one via linear interpolation.
16 See the following internet-pages: www.bundestag.de, www.gallup.com, www.electionworld.org and
www.klipsan.com/elecnew.htm.13
Table I. Sample data for CPI-inﬂation.
Country Data source Sample period
Australia (AUS) Australian Bureau of Statistics 1952:01-2001:10
Austria (AUT) OSTAT 1957:01-2000:00
Canada (CAN) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2001:08
Denmark (DEN) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1960:01-2001:09
Finland (FIN) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2000:00
France (FRA) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2000:00
Germany (GER) Federal Statistical Oﬃce 1952:01-2000:00
Iceland (ICE) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1976:01-2001:10
Ireland (IRE) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1962:01-2000:00
Luxembourg (LUX) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2000:00
Netherlands (NET) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2000:00
Norway (NOR) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2001:09
Portugal (POR) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2000:00
Sweden (SWE) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1962:01-2000:00
Spain (SPA) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1977:06-2000:00
United Kingdom (UK) International Financial Statistics (IMF) 1957:01-2001:08
United States (USA) Bureau of Labor Statistics 1950:01-2001:10
Table II. Sample data for unemployment.
Country Data Source Sample period
Australia (AUS) Australian Bureau of Statistics 1966:08-2001:10
Austria (AUT) OSTAT 1960:01-2000:12
Canada (CAN) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1962:01-2001:10
Denmark (DEN) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1960:01-2001:09
Finland (FIN) Central Statistic Oﬃce Finland 1960:01-2000:12
France (FRA) INSEE 1967:12-2000:12
Germany (GER) Deutsche Bundesbank 1952:01-2000:00
Iceland (ICE) Statistics Iceland 1976:01-2001:10
Ireland (IRE) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1960:01-2000:12
Netherlands (NET) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1970:01-2000:12
Norway (NOR) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1972:01-2001:08
Portugal (POR) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1983:01-2000:12
Sweden (SWE) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1970:01-2000:10
Spain (SPA) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1977:06-2000:12
United Kingdom (UK) Department of Unemployment UK 1971:01-2001:10
United States (USA) Main Economic Indicators (OECD) 1950:01-2001:1014













Norway Groß and Rotholz (1999)
Portugal Merkel and Stiehl (1999)
Sweden Jahn (1999)
Spain Barrios (1999)
United Kingdom Sturm (1999)
United States Banks (1994)
do some descriptive analysis via comparing the inﬂation rates under left-wing and right-
wing governments on a country base. Since inﬂation (as well as other macroeconomic
variables) responds slowly to policy changes we study various lags (x=0,3,6,9 and 12
months). Table IV shows the results for the countries in the sample for a lag of x=3
months.17 Column 2 contains the average inﬂation rate in the given country. Columns 3
and 4 show the average inﬂation rate under right-wing respective left-wing governments
(number of observations in parentheses). To test whether the diﬀerences we found are
signiﬁcant we ﬁrst test for equalities of variances (column 5) and then run a t-test on the
signiﬁcance of the mean inﬂation rates under left-wing and right-wing governments. The
t-value of this test is reported in column 6, the referring level of signiﬁcance in column
7. The last column 8 summarizes whether the ﬁndings are in line with the hypothesis of
permanent partisan diﬀerences in the inﬂation rate.18
17 We do not report the results for the other four lags, here. The results do only diﬀer slightly.
18 The used symbols should be interpreted as follows: ”+” means that the observed diﬀerence in inﬂation
rates is in line with theory, but insigniﬁcant. Accordingly ”-” indicates that the observed diﬀerence
contradicts to partisan theory. A ”++” or ”- -” indicates that the ﬁndings are signiﬁcant to the ®=90%-
conﬁdence-level.15
Table IV. CPI inﬂation under left-wing and right-wing governments (x=3)
country ; ; ; sig. t-value sig. theory-
r-w g. l-w g. var. inf conform
AUS 5.32 4.56 6.89 0.03 -6.65 0.00 ++
(395) (191)
AUT 3.79 3.12 4.07 0.00 -4.57 0.00 ++
(154) (362)
CAN 4.46 3.33 5.06 0.00 -5.96 0.00 ++
(183) (341)
DEN 5.92 5.96 5.90 0.01 0.14 0.89 -
(165) (324)
FIN 6.06 4.79 7.19 0.00 -6.43 0.00 ++
(242) (274)
FRA 5.66 6.18 4.43 0.07 4.54 0.00 - -
(363) (153)
GER 2.89 2.13 4.56 0.00 -16.81 0.00 ++
(395) (181)
ICE 22.93 17.82 32.47 0.01 -5.58 0.00 ++
(194) (104)
IRE 7.43 5.89 10.53 0.00 -8.41 0.00 ++
(305) (151)
LUX 3.74 7.22 3.23 0.04 11.49 0.00 - -
(65) (451)
NET 3.97 3.53 4.89 0.00 -5.29 0.00 ++
(348) (168)
NOR 5.47 5.49 5.46 0.00 0.10 0.92 -
(178) (347)
POR 9.84 9.19 10.68 0.00 -1.38 0.17 +
(120) (93)
SWE 5.92 8.03 5.27 0.00 7.06 0.00 - -
(108) (350)
SPA 7.71 9.05 6.80 0.00 3.96 0.00 - -
(110) (161)
UK 6.44 5.71 7.87 0.00 -4.47 0.00 ++
(347) (177)
USA 4.04 4.10 3.97 0.00 0.53 0.60 -
(344) (266)
The evidence is somewhat mixed. In 9 out of 17 countries, we ﬁnd diﬀerences in
the inﬂation rate that are signiﬁcantly in line with partisan theory (Australia, Austria,
Canada, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands and United Kingdom). We
also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly contradicting results in 4 countries (France, Luxembourg, Sweden16
and Spain). For Denmark, Norway, Portugal and the United States we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the inﬂation rate under left- and right-wing governments.
However, the results of this descriptive test have to be interpreted very carefully.
Since most of the countries in our sample are engaged in international trade and con-
siderable ﬁnancial linkages exist between these countries, we should take international
interdependencies, e.g. imported inﬂation, into account.
It is also quite likely that the (relatively long) time series of CPI inﬂation (and un-
employment) are subject to structural breaks, e.g. in consequence of the 1970’s oil price
crises. More than 75% of the countries in the sample are EU members and most of them
started qualifying for the EMU in the early 1990s. According to the Maastricht Treaty’s
inﬂation criterion several countries had a strong incentive to lower their inﬂation rate in
order to be allowed to take part in the European Monetary Union. While the problem
of structural breaks can generally be solved by analyzing appropriate subperiods of the
whole sample period, the remaining periods are often quite short. To be able to discover
partisan eﬀects at least some observations for both basic types of governments have to be
available. Due to the fact that political elections and changes in government are relatively
rare events, it is often impossible to divide the country samples into shorter sub-samples
without structural breaks.
In addition, when testing for unit-roots in the time series of monthly reported year-
on-year CPI inﬂation it becomes obvious that the results of the often applied and above
presented descriptive test might be misleading. An ADF-test reveals that for 15 out
of 17 time series the hypothesis of unit-roots cannot be rejected at a 90%-signiﬁcance-
level (exceptions are the United Kingdom and Norway). Thus, when one is using the
earlier described time series of monthly reported year-on-year CPI inﬂation in regression
analysis, the problem of spurious correlations might occur (compare e.g. Harvey (1990),
p. 59).
Our empirical design builds up on Alesina and Roubini’s (1992) approach to pool the
data. We then run pooled least squares (PLS) regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects. By doing so
we allow for long-term country-speciﬁc eﬀects while assuming the other parameters of17
the model to be constant and equal across all countries in the sample. Structural breaks
can then be captured by additional dummy variables without causing the data set to
shrink below a critical level. To correct for international dependencies we follow Alesina
and Roubini (1992) and add the average CPI inﬂation rate of the G7 countries19 as
additional regressor to the panel regressions.20
The problem of non-stationarity can be solved by using the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
monthly reported year-on-year inﬂation rates, which are regularly stationary. The major
disadvantage of doing so is that all information on the absolute level of inﬂation is lost.
Since it is primarily the level of inﬂation which we are interested in, we decided to
solve the problem by diﬀerent means. The problem of non-stationarity of the monthly
reported year-on-year inﬂation rate is at least partially due to the method of calculating





ADF-tests reveal that for all countries in the sample but Iceland21 the hypothesis of a
unit-root can be rejected at a 90%-conﬁdence-level. Diﬀerent from Alesina and Roubini
(1992) we therefore use monthly inﬂation for our empirical test.
Thus, we end up with the following panel regression equation22
wi
Pt = ®1 ¢ wi
Pt¡1 + ::: + ®n ¢ wi
Pt¡n
+®n+1 ¢ DAUS + ::: + ®m ¢ DUSA + ®m+1 ¢ DEMU
t
+®m+2 ¢ wG7




19 The CPI data of the G7 countries were taken from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Since there
are no data for the average CPI inﬂation rate of the G7 countries before 1963 the sample for the panel
regression is a little bit smaller than in the descriptive test.
20 Even if the G7-variable is quite powerful we decided to enter it into the regression equation since
there is no other obvious way to correct for international dependencies.
21 We decided not to delete Iceland from the sample since the test on unit-roots was only marginally
signiﬁcant. The basic results of all following tests are not inﬂuenced by this decision.
22 Principally, the regression could also be run with appropriate instrument variables (e.g. monetary
aggregates or interest rates) instead of inﬂation. In this paper we focus exclusively on the ﬁnal target-
variable inﬂation. One could also think about estimating a structural model including other variables
that can be supposed to inﬂuence inﬂation. However, we think the country-speciﬁc eﬀects to be captured
adequately by the country dummies and the lag structure of the endogenous variable. The international
interdependency is captured by the G7-variable.18
with wi
Pt being the monthly CPI inﬂation rate at time t in country i, wG7
Pt being the
average monthly reported monthly inﬂation rate of the G7-countries, x being the time-
lag of changes in monetary policy and ²t being the unexplained residual. DAUS is one of
the country dummies which is deﬁned as
DAUS :=
½
1 ; for observations from Australia
0 ; else: (4)
The country dummies are used to capture country speciﬁc eﬀects as they, for example,
result from diﬀerent levels of central bank independence.23 The more independent a
central bank is the less pronounced the political business cycles should be. The other
country dummies (one for each country in the sample) are deﬁned accordingly. DEMU is
a dummy variable covering the transitional phase to the EMU as well as the time since





1 ; for t > 1992 : 12
0 ; else (5)
for each country j being in the European Union. Since the countries needed some time
to react on the Maastricht Treaty we decided to deﬁne the EMU dummy from 1992:12
onwards. We also tested for several other dummies for possible structural breaks (as e.g.
the end of Bretton Woods24) but they all turned out to be insigniﬁcant. The central
partisan dummy variable D
Partisan;i





1 ; if a right-wing government is in oﬃce in period t
¡1 ; if a left-wing government is in oﬃce in period t (6)
According to partisan theory under both adaptive and rational expectations we should
ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient for the partisan dummy.
23 Similarly to Alesina and Roubini (1992) we therefore do not include an additional proxy variable for
central bank independence. Whenever the degree of central bank independence is subject to changes in
the course of time it would be useful to include time-variant indices of central bank independence into
the regression. However, we did not ﬁnd appropriate time series of indices of central bank independence
in the literature.
24 Including the Bretton Woods dummy into the regressions, even though highly insigniﬁcant, does
not change our results. The level of signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of the central partisan dummy slightly
increases in this case. The results are also stable when we exclude all observations during the Bretton
Woods regime, i.e. the begin of the sample period is set to 1971 or 1973.19
Table V. Panel regression permanent partisan eﬀects on inﬂation.
Variable x=0 x=3 x=6 x=9 x=12
wPt¡1 0.0997 0.0999 0.1001 0.0999 0.0100
(8.80) (8.82) (8.84) (8.82) (8.83)
wPt¡2 0.2422 0.2423 0.2426 0.2424 0.2425
(22.19) (22.20) (22.23) (22.22) (22.23)
wPt¡3 0.2944 0.2944 0.2946 0.2946 0.2947
(26.33) (26.34) (26.35) (26.36) (26.37)
w
G7
Pt 0.3422 0.3422 0.3423 0.3420 0.3425
(15.66) (15.66) (15.66) (15.65) (15.67)
D
EMU -0.0381 -0.03744 -0.0363 -0.0368 -0.0356
(-2.25) (-2.22) (-2.16) (-2.19) (-2.12)
D
Partisan







AUS 0.0468 0.0465 0.0459 0.0466 0.0459
D
AUT -0.0235 -0.0235 -0.0229 -0.0241 -0.0231
D
CAN 0.0084 0.0083 0.0086 0.0078 0.0085
D
DEN 0.0407 0.0404 0.0401 0.0401 0.0398
D
FIN 0.0499 0.0496 0.0492 0.0492 0.0490
D
FRA 0.0324 0.0321 0.0311 0.0326 0.0313
D
GER -0.0342 -0.0345 -0.0351 -0.0341 -0.0350
D
ICE 0.4350 0.4343 0.4328 0.4341 0.4328
D
IRE 0.0888 0.0882 0.0869 0.0883 0.0868
D
LUX -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0159 -0.0175 -0.0163
D
NET -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0039 -0.0052
D
NOR 0.0296 0.0294 0.0293 0.0288 0.0289
D
POR 0.1590 0.1583 0.1570 0.1581 0.1567
D
SPA 0.0975 0.0971 0.0968 0.0966 0.0964
D
SWE 0.0346 0.0345 0.0349 0.0338 0.0345
D
UK 0.0781 0.0777 0.0768 0.0781 0.0769
D
USA 0.0049 0.0045 0.0041 0.0045 0.0040
r
2 46.74 46.73 46.73 46.74 46.73
The regression results are shown in table V.25 Three lags of the dependent variable
were necessary to correct for autocorrelation.26 For all lags (x=0,3,6,9,12) we ﬁnd a
negative coeﬃcient for the partisan dummy. For the lags x=0,3,9 the partisan dummy is
25 The table shows the estimated coeﬃcients. The values in parentheses are the referring t-values.
Signiﬁcance levels for the central partisan dummy are reported as follows: ’*’ for a 90%-signiﬁcance-level,
’**’ for 95% and ’***’ for more than 99%.
26 The number of lags of the dependent variable was determined via an inspection of the autocorrel-
ogram. Following Stier (2001) we included all successive lags for which the partial autocorrelation was
diﬀerent from zero on a conﬁdence-level of 95%.20
signiﬁcant at the 95%-conﬁdence-level, for the lag x=12 at the 90%-conﬁdence-level. For
the lag x=6 the partisan dummy is marginally insigniﬁcant. The EMU-dummy as well as
the average G7 CPI inﬂation rate turn out to be highly signiﬁcant for all of the analyzed
lags of the partisan dummy.27
Altogether, we interpret our empirical results with respect to inﬂation to be sup-
portive of partisan theory. For 4 out of 5 lag structures we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients which are in line with partisan theory. For the lag x=6 the coeﬃcient is
marginally insigniﬁcant. In contrast to the study of Alesina and Roubini (1992) we do
not have to restrict our sample to a subsample of so-called bi-partisan countries (with very
pronounced diﬀerences between left-wing and right-wing governments) to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
partisan diﬀerences in the inﬂation rates.
4.3. Partisan differences in unemployment
Since the implications of partisan theory under adaptive and under rational expectations
diﬀer with respect to the expected unemployment pattern it seems to be reasonable to
split the analysis into two parts. We start out with a test of the existence of permanent
partisan diﬀerences in unemployment, as predicted by partisan theory under adaptive
expectations, and then turn to an analysis of temporary unemployment eﬀects as they
result from rational partisan theory. In partisan theory under both adaptive and rational
expectations, partisan diﬀerences in unemployment ﬁnally result from monetary policy
rather than ﬁscal policy. We therefore do not study ﬁscal policy instruments as is often
done with respect to opportunistic political business cycle theory.
27 It is well known that the correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variables
might lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters in dynamic ﬁxed-eﬀects models (Hsiao (1986)).
However, Hsiao (1986) also showed that this problem does not occur in panel sets with large numbers of
time-series observations per country. Since our shortest time series consists of more than 240 observations
the parameter estimates of our model are consistent.21
4.3.1. Permanent eﬀects
Again we begin with some descriptive statistics. In table IV, we show the results of the
comparison of unemployment rates under left-wing and right-wing governments in the
sample countries for the case of a time lag of 6 months.28
Table VI. Unemployment rates under left-wing and right-wing governments (x=6)
country ; ; ; sig. t-value sig. theory-
r-w g. l-w g. var. alq conform
AUS 6.18 5.08 7.53 0.19 -10.27 0.00 - -
(232) (191)
AUT 3.93 2.95 4.31 0.00 -7.65 0.00 - -
(137) (355)
CAN 7.65 8.68 7.23 0.00 6.31 0.00 ++
(138) (332)
DEN 7.12 7.63 6.37 0.59 6.29 0.00 ++
(138) (92)
FIN 5.67 6.36 5.11 0.00 3.12 0.00 ++
(221) (271)
FRA 7.68 6.36 9.86 0.00 -11.26 0.00 - -
(247) (150)
GER 5.84 6.61 4.54 0.00 5.46 0.00 ++
(290) (178)
ICE 1.55 1.99 0.79 0.00 8.24 0.00 ++
(234) (140)
IRE 10.49 9.45 13.07 0.00 -9.75 0.00 - -
(350) (142)
NET 5.76 6.59 4.49 0.00 10.12 0.00 ++
(225) (147)
NOR 3.26 2.91 3.41 0.00 -2.92 0.00 - -
(108) (248)
POR 6.38 6.15 6.73 0.00 -2.48 0.01 - -
(130) (86)
SWE 3.63 4.04 3.46 0.03 2.27 0.02 ++
(108) (273)
SPA 19.23 17.13 20.10 0.64 -7.91 0.00 - -
(110) (161)
UK 6.11 7.11 3.77 0.00 12.51 0.00 ++
(347) (177)
USA 5.94 6.68 5.16 0.00 12.32 0.00 ++
(344) (266)
28 We also studied the lags of x=0,3,9,12 months without considerable diﬀerences in the results.22
For 9 out of 16 countries we ﬁnd signiﬁcant unemployment diﬀerences which are
in line with partisan theory under adaptive expectations (Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States).
In the remaining 7 countries (Australia, Austria, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and
Spain) the unemployment rates under right-wing governments were signiﬁcantly lower
than under left-wing governments.
However, the descriptive analysis of unemployment diﬀerences suﬀers from the same
problems as that on inﬂation rates in the last section. ADF-tests reveal that none of
the time series of unemployment rates are stationary. Thus, they should not be used to
run panel regressions. There are two possible solutions to this problem: on the one hand
one might use the diﬀerence between the domestic unemployment rate and the average
unemployment rate of the G7-countries as a left-hand variable. On the other hand we
might work with the ﬁrst diﬀerences in unemployment rates.
Alesina and Roubini (1992) decided to use the diﬀerence between the unemployment
rates of the domestic country and the average of the G7-countries as a dependent variable.
They state in this respect: ,,By taking the diﬀerence of domestic unemployment from
a world weighted average, unit roots problems are somewhat mitigated, but certainly
not eliminated” (Alesina and Roubini (1992), p. 287-288). Though Alesina and Roubini
(1992) provide no formal test, their suspicion is right: the time-series of diﬀerences be-
tween domestic and world weighted average unemployment are not stationary, either
(even if to a lesser extent than the time-series of unemployment rates themselves). Thus,
we might ﬁnd spurious correlations even when using the diﬀerence of a domestic and a
world weighted average of unemployment as dependent variable. Neglecting this problem
for the moment, we estimate the following panel regression:
(alqi
t ¡ alqG7
t ) = ®1 ¢ (alqi
t¡1 ¡ alqG7
t¡1) + ::: + ®n ¢ (alqi
t¡n ¡ alqG7
t¡n)






t being the monthly reported unemployment rate at time t in country i and alqG7
t
being the monthly reported average unemployment of the G7-countries.29 The country
dummies and the partisan dummy (compare equation 6) are the same as in the inﬂation
regressions. Theory predicts a positive sign of the coeﬃcient of the partisan dummy. The
regression results are summarized in table VII.30
Table VII. Panel regression permanent partisan eﬀects on unemployment (diﬀerence to G7-countries).





t¡1 1.0033 1.0035 1.0015 1.0014 1.0013





t¡2 0.0958 0.0957 0.0959 0.0958 0.0955





t¡3 -0.1039 -0.1040 -0.1021 -0.1019 -0.1012
(-8.15) (-8.15) (-7.96) (-7.91) (-7.83)
D
Partisan
t¡x 0.0035 0.0018 0.0021 0.0024 0.0027
(1.29) (0.65) (0.76) (0.87) (0.97)
D
AUS 0.0063 0.0065 0.0072 0.0071 0.0067
D
DEN -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0029
D
GER 0.0158 0.0161 0.0162 0.0164 0.0163
D
FIN 0.0146 0.0142 0.0149 0.0149 0.0139
D
FRA 0.0167 0.0170 0.0163 0.0163 0.0157
D
UK -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0037
D
IRE 0.0169 0.0175 0.0161 0.0164 0.0152
D
ICE -0.0297 -0.0292 -0.0266 -0.0250 -0.0239
D
CAN 0.0105 0.0096 0.0010 0.0103 0.0091
D
NET -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0013
D
NOR -0.0127 -0.0133 -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0129
D
AUT -0.0039 -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0038 -0,0038
D
POR -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0069 -0.0109 -0.0116
D
SWE -0.0010 -0.0106 -0.0084 -0.0087 -0.0068
D
SPA 0.0669 0.0659 0.0642 0.0649 0.0566
D
USA -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0042
r
2 99.73 99.73 99.73 99.73 99.73
29 Diﬀerent from weighted G7 CPI inﬂation there was no suﬃcient long time series available for weighted
G7 unemployment. Instead we decided to calculate the time series for alq
G7
t on our own by using GDP
ﬁgures of the G7 countries as weights. The referring (yearly) data are from OECD Main Economic
Outlook. Due to data problems with respect to France and the United Kingdom the time series for alq
G7
t
is based upon G5 until 1967:12 and upon G6 until 1971:01.
30 We also tested for additional dummy variables, adjusting for possible structural breaks, but again
none of them turned out to be signiﬁcant.24
Three lags of the dependent variable were necessary to correct for autocorrelation.
While the coeﬃcients of the partisan dummy for all lags x = 0;3;6;9;12 are positive,
none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence
in favor of partisan theory under adaptive expectations with respect to unemployment
rates. Because of the earlier described problems of unit roots in the time series of the
dependent variable the results might be biased.
We therefore decided to apply an additional test using ﬁrst diﬀerences of unemploy-
ment rates. On a conﬁdence-level of 90% the hypothesis of no unit-roots could not be
rejected for the ﬁrst diﬀerences of unemployment rates. While using the ﬁrst diﬀerences
is a proper solution from an econometric point of view we obviously have to adjust our
test design to test for permanent partisan eﬀects in unemployment rates due to the fact
that we are now dealing with changes in unemployment instead of absolute levels of
unemployment.
According to partisan theory under adaptive expectations, unemployment under left-
wing governments should be permanently lower than under right-wing governments.
Therefore we should be able ﬁnd unemployment rising after a change from a left-wing
government to a right-wing government and vice versa. It is important to underline that
permanent partisan eﬀects on unemployment are consistent with temporary changing
growth rates of the unemployment rate. Thus, when estimating the panel regression
d(alq)i
t = ®1 ¢ d(alq)i
t¡1 + ::: + ®n ¢ d(alq)i
t¡n
+®n+1 ¢ DAUS + ::: + ®m ¢ DUSA
+®m+1 ¢ d(alq)G7




a positive coeﬃcient for the partisan dummy, covering changes of governmental orienta-
tion, would be in line with partisan theory under adaptive expectations. The partisan
dummy D
GovChange;i





> > > > <
> > > > :
1 in K ¡ 1 months after a change
to a right-wing government in country i
¡1 in K ¡ 1 months after a change
to a left-wing government in country i
0 else
(9)25
with K being the number of months the temporary partisan eﬀect is supposed to last.
Since we deal with temporary increases in the growth rate of unemployment we study
the cases of K=12,18,24. The results for the case of K = 12 are reported in table VIII.31
Table VIII. Panel regression permanent (K=12) partisan eﬀects on unemployment.
Variable x=0 x=3 x=6 x=9 x=12
d(alq)t¡1 -0.0115 -0.0114 -0.0113 -0.0110 -0.0125
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.95)
d(alq)t¡2 0.0889 0.0893 0.0891 0.0885 0.0878
(6.84) (6.87) (6.86) (6.80) (6.72)
d(alq)t¡3 0.1667 0.1671 0.1669 0.1673 0.1673
(12.81) (12.84) (12.82) (12.83) (12.82)
d(alq)t¡4 0.0780 0.0784 0.0782 0.0788 0.0788
(6.04) (6.06) (6.05) (6.07) (6.06)
d(alq)t¡5 0.0837 0.0838 0.0837 0.0834 0.0822
(6.49) (6.51) (6.49) (6.45) (6.34)
d(alq)t¡6 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0665 0.0675
(5.19) (5.20) (5.19) (5.13) (5.19)
d(alq)
G7
t 0.3782 0.3787 0.3787 0.3789 0.3754
(13.37) (13.38) (13.38) (13.34) (13.16)
D
GovChange
t¡x 0.0091 -0.0055 -0.0006 0.0013 0.0065
(1.31) (-0.79) (-0.09) (0.19) (0.94)
D
AUS 0.0045 0.0045 0.0045 0.0045 0.0042
D
DEN -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0485 -0.0051
D
GER 0.0095 0.0089 0.0091 -0.0092 0.0094
D
FIN 0.0085 0.0081 0.0083 0.0083 0.0084
D
FRA 0.0055 0.0050 0.0052 0.0053 0.0059
D
UK -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012
D
IRE -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0057
D
ICE -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0012
D
CAN 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026
D
NET 0.0011 0.0006 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012
D
NOR 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016 0.0010 0.0000
D
AUT 0.0071 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009
D
POR -0.0071 -0.0078 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0062
D
SWE 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020 0.0017 0.0024
D
SPA -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006
D
USA -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015
r
2 12.63 12.62 12.60 12.58 12.51
31 The results for the cases of K = 18 and K = 24 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the case K = 12.26
Six lags of the dependent variable were necessary to correct for autocorrelation. While
for the lags x = 0 and x = 12 the coeﬃcient is in fact positive, for the other 3 lags the
coeﬃcients are negative. None of the 5 coeﬃcients turn out to be signiﬁcant. Thus, we
ﬁnd no empirical evidence supporting partisan theory under adaptive expectations with
respect to unemployment.
4.3.2. Temporary eﬀects depending on electoral surprise
Rational partisan theory implies, as it was shown earlier, temporary post-electoral shifts
in unemployment due to pre-electoral uncertainty about the election outcome. The magni-
tude of these booms and recessions should, according to rational partisan theory, depend
on the degree of uncertainty about the election result. Unemployment should fall back
to its initial (natural) level as soon as wages have been adjusted to meet unexpected
price-level shocks.
In order to test for rational partisan cycles in unemployment rates we run panel
regressions of the type
d(alq)i
t = ®1 ¢ d(alq)i
t¡1 + ::: + ®n ¢ d(alq)i
t¡n
+®n+1 ¢ DAUS + ::: + ®m ¢ DUSA
+®m+1 ¢ d(alq)G7




t is intended to cover the degree of ex ante electoral uncertainty in
country i. Since electoral uncertainty is not directly observable, we use pre-electoral
polling data to construct an indicator of electoral uncertainty. Suﬃciently long time
series32 for pre-electoral polling data were available for 6 countries: Australia, France,
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The sources
of the polling data are shown in table IX.
Basically, the polling data from the diﬀerent countries are quite similar. The data
for Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden are aggregated responses
to the so-called ,,Sunday-question”: ,,For which party would you vote if there were a
32 We included all countries into the sample for which polling data for at least 4 elections and at least
6 months before the election were available.27
Table IX. Sources of pre-electoral polling data.
Country Source Data available since
Australia Roy Morgan Research Center 1961
France TNS SOFRES 1978
Germany Institut f¨ ur Demoskopie Allensbach 1961
Sweden Sifo Consulting and Research 1968
United Kingdom Market and Opinion Research International Ltd. 1979
United States Gallup Company 1936
general election next Sunday?” In the United States the question slightly diﬀers: Instead
of asking for the preferred party the interviewees are asked to reveal their preferred
Presidential candidate. For France no comparable data were available. We use polling
data on the popularity of the current prime minister to assess pre-electoral uncertainty
instead, thereby assuming that a high popularity of the current prime minister is a good
proxy for a high probability of reelection (and vice versa).
Principally, there are diﬀerent possibilities to make use of the polling data to assess the
electoral surprise of an election result. Cohen (1993) developed a technique to convert the
polling data into election probabilities using basic ideas of option pricing theory. Using
this approach Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) ﬁnd supporting evidence for rational
partisan eﬀects on unemployment for the United States. While this is an adequate and
elegant idea we found it hard to apply it to our country sample due to the fact that we
deal not only with (more or less) pure two-party democracies. We therefore decided to
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V left
V right+V left in K months after the election of
a right-wing government in country i
V left
V right+V left ¡ 1 in K months after the election of
a left-wing government in country i
(11)
capturing pre-electoral uncertainty, with K being the number of months the temporary
partisan eﬀect is supposed to last and V right;i being the average vote share right-wing28
parties got in polls during the 12 months33 before the election.34 By construction, we have
0 · SURi
t · 1 for the case of a right-wing government to be installed after an election
and 0 ¸ SURi
t ¸ ¡1 for left-wing ones. The absolute value of the variable increases in the
electoral surprise, i.e. the larger the relative vote share of the election-loosing ideology
was on average before the election. According to rational partisan theory the coeﬃcient
of the surprise-variable should be signiﬁcantly positive.35
The results of the panel regressions for K = 12;18;24 and the lags x = 0;3;6;9;12 are
shown in tables X, XI and XII. The coeﬃcients of the surprise-variable are in line with
rational partisan theory for all surprise periods K and all lags x. With the exceptions
of the two most ,,extreme” cases K = 12;x = 0 and K = 24;x = 12 all coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at least on a 90%-conﬁdence-level, most of them even on higher levels of
conﬁdence.
We interpret these results as supportive of partisan theory under rational expectations.
Thus, pre-electoral uncertainty seems to have a signiﬁcant temporary impact on the
post-electoral development of real activity.
Some remarks should be made with respect to the relatively low levels of r2 in the
regressions. From a theoretical point of view, as we have argued earlier, partisan eﬀects
can be supposed to be the more pronounced in countries with highly dependent central
banks. Thus, it may pay oﬀ to have a closer look at the degree of central bank inde-
pendence in the sample countries. Cukierman (1994) developed an index of central bank
independence, based on the legal rules concerning central banks during the 1980’s. In his
33 For the United States the number of months that were included into the calculation of the average
ﬁgures is sometimes below 12 months due to data problems. In this case we used the maximum number of
available observations, which was at least 7 for all elections. For some countries more than one observation
per month were available. We ﬁrst calculated a monthly average in this case and then proceeded to
calculate the yearly average in these comparatively rare cases.
34 Especially Germany has experienced a signiﬁcant number of coalition governments. Therefore it is
not suﬃcient to concentrate on the major parties which are often easily to identify with left and right
ideologies. For Germany we supposed good poll results for the Greens to increase the probability that a
left-wing government will be elected. Since the Free Democrats (FDP) were often in coalition governments
of diﬀerent ideologies we added their vote share in the polls to the left-wing or the right-wing according to
their pre-electoral statements on FDP’s will to form a certain coalition or, if there was no such statement,
to the ideology they later on decided to form a coalition with.
35 One could also think about using the share of undecided voters to assess the degree of electoral
uncertainty. However, we have no appropriate data available to do so.29
Table X. Panel regression temporary (K=12) partisan eﬀects on unemployment.
Variable x=0 x=3 x=6 x=9 x=12
d(alq)t¡1 -0.1246 -0.1253 -0.1294 -0.1267 -0.1239
(-5.92) (-5.95) (-6.14) (-6.00) (-5.85)
d(alq)t¡2 0.0571 0.0551 0.0510 0.0502 0.0518
(2.71) (2.61) (2.42) (2.37) (2.44)
d(alq)t¡3 0.2353 0.2342 0.2321 0.2313 0.2311
(11.23) (11.17) (11.08) (10.99) (10.93)
d(alq)t¡4 0.1185 0.1175 0.1184 0.1160 0.1152
(5.69) (5.64) (5.69) (5.56) (5.49)
d(alq)t¡5 0.0902 0.0892 0.0906 0.0887 0.0879
(4.32) (4.29) (4.34) (4.24) (4.18)
d(alq)t¡6 0.0742 0.0738 0.0749 0.0741 0.0717
(3.55) (3.53) (3.58) (3.54) (3.41)
d(alq)
G7
t 0.5682 0.5779 0.5839 0.5851 0.5866
(14.16) (14.32) (14.43) (14.40) (14.37)







AUS 0.0037 0.0037 0.0038 0.0038 0.0034
D
GER 0.0086 0.0088 0.0089 0.0088 0.0087
D
FRA 0.0041 0.0059 0.0059 0.0046 0.0038
D
UK -0.0115 -0.0123 -0.0125 -0.0116 -0.0111
D
SWE 0.0011 0.0030 0.0042 0.0035 0.0038
D
USA -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0036
r
2 22.85 22.98 23.31 23.26 23.09
study of 68 countries the central banks of Germany (2nd) and the United States (6th),
both part of our sample, are ranked on the top of independent central banks. The other
four countries: the United Kingdom (37th), Australia (39th), France (44th) and Sweden
(46th) are ranked in the (lower) midﬁeld. During the 90’s the United Kingdom, France
and Sweden remarkably increased their degree of central bank independence, partly due
to encouragement by the European Union. This development of the 1990’s is not captured
by the Cukierman-index. Altogether we therefore suppose the low explanatory power of
the electoral surprise variable to be partially due to the high degree of central bank
independence in the sample countries. However, the coeﬃcients for the surprise-variable30
Table XI. Panel regression temporary (K=18) partisan eﬀects on unemployment.
Variable x=0 x=3 x=6 x=9 x=12
d(alq)t¡1 -0.1277 -0.1261 -0.1269 -0.1264 -0.1234
(-6.06) (-5.99) (-6.02) (-5.99) (-5.83)
d(alq)t¡2 0.0539 0.0535 0.0521 0.0506 0.0529
(2.56) (2.54) (2.47) (2.39) (2.49)
d(alq)t¡3 0.2333 0.2322 0.2316 0.2318 0.2322
(11.15) (11.07) (11.03) (11.01) (10.98)
d(alq)t¡4 0.1178 0.1158 0.1168 0.1163 0.1158
(5.66) (5.55) (5.60) (5.57) (5.51)
d(alq)t¡5 0.0903 0.0879 0.0822 0.0874 0.0883
(4.33) (4.21) (4.22) (4.18) (4.19)
d(alq)t¡6 0.0747 0.0733 0.0725 0.0720 0.0718
(3.58) (3.51) (3.47) (3.44) (3.41)
d(alq)
G7
t 0.5717 0.5787 0.5826 0.5864 0.5860
(14.26) (14.34) (14.43) (14.43) (14.34)








AUS 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037 0.0038 0.0034
D
GER 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0088 0.0086
D
FRA 0.0043 0.0060 0.0060 0.0047 0.0037
D
UK -0.0135 -0.0132 -0.0124 -0.0120 -0.0108
D
SWE 0.0033 0.0039 0.0042 0.0040 0.0036
D
USA -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0034
r
2 23.13 23.06 23.13 23.22 22.99
are signiﬁcant, thereby indicating that even in countries with comparatively independent
central banks signiﬁcant partisan eﬀects seem to exist.
We should also take into account that - due to the already described non-stationarity-
problems - we use ﬁrst diﬀerences of unemployment in our panel-regressions. Since the
degree of autocorrelation in ﬁrst diﬀerences is considerably lower than in unemployment
levels the values of r2 are also lower.31
Table XII. Panel regression temporary (K=24) partisan eﬀects on unemployment.
Variable x=0 x=3 x=6 x=9 x=12
d(alq)t¡1 -0.1264 -0.1265 -0.1262 -0.1244 -0.1229
(-6.00) (-6.01) (-5.98) (-5.89) (-5.80)
d(alq)t¡2 0.0545 0.0530 0.0531 0.0529 0.0540
(2.58) (2.51) (2.51) (2.50) (2.54)
d(alq)t¡3 0.2327 0.2319 0.2323 0.2334 0.2331
(11.10) (11.05) (11.05) (11.09) (11.02)
d(alq)t¡4 0.1165 0.1156 0.1166 0.1168 0.1167
(5.59) (5.55) (5.58) (5.58) (5.56)
d(alq)t¡5 0.0885 0.0870 0.08879 0.0877 0.0891
(4.24) (4.17) (4.19) (4.18) (4.23)
d(alq)t¡6 0.0731 0.0717 0.0723 0.0721 0.0722
(3.49) (3.43) (3.45) (3.44) (3.43)
d(alq)
G7
t 0.5793 0.5793 0.5819 0.5838 0.5852
(14.23) (14.35) (14.35) (14.36) (14.32)







AUS 0.0034 0.0033 0.0034 0.0035 0.0032
D
GER 0.0090 0.0089 0.0087 0.0085 0.0084
D
FRA 0.0044 0.0061 0.0059 0.0045 0.0037
D
UK -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.0122 -0.0113 -0.0105
D
SWE 0.0047 0.0046 0.0041 0.0034 0.0033
D
USA -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0033
r
2 23.04 23.07 23.01 23.06 22.85
5. Conclusions and outlook
While we ﬁnd signiﬁcant partisan diﬀerences in inﬂation rates under left-wing and right-
wing governments we do not ﬁnd permanent diﬀerences in unemployment rates. Therefore
we have to reject the hypothesis of the existence of partisan cycles as they are predicted
by models with adaptive expectations of the private sector for our sample of 16 countries.
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis of the existence of partisan cycles result-
ing from pre-electoral uncertainty on the election outcome for our sample of 6 OECD
countries. As predicted by partisan theory under rational expectations we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
temporary increases in the unemployment rate after unexpected elections of right-wing
governments and temporarily decreasing unemployment rates after unexpected elections32
of left-wing ones. While the electoral surprise has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on post-electoral
development of unemployment, it turns not out to be the major explanation for the
unemployment pattern. We suppose this to be due to the relatively high degree of
central bank independence in the sample countries. Obviously, pre-electoral uncertainty
regarding the election result is therefore a signiﬁcant but surely not the only factor in
determining the unemployment rate in the aftermath of elections.
For future research the analysis should be extended to a sample of countries with highly
dependent central banks. A major obstacle to such an analysis is the lack of appropriate
polling-data that can be used to create reasonable indices of electoral uncertainty.
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